(Sanskrut: Prashastpad Bhashya text sourced from Sanskrut Wikipedia, English: Mahamopadhyay Pandit Ganganath Jha’s transaltion in 1916)
८.१२: १७१.१६बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानम्प्रत्ययैतिपर्यायाः ॥
The words buddhi, upulabdhi, jnana and pratyaya are synonymous.
८.१२: १७२.१३साचानेकप्रकारार्थानन्त्यात्प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वाच्च ॥
Buddhi has various forms, as objects are endless, and it appertains to each individual object,
८.१२: १७२.१९तस्याःसत्यप्यनेकविधत्वेसमासतोद्वेविधेविद्याचाविद्याचेति । तत्राविद्याचतुर्विधासंशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायस्वप्नलक्षणा ॥
Though there are many kinds of buddhi, yet briefly it is of two kinds, in the form of vidya ‘knowledge’ and avidya ‘non-knowledge’ or Ignorance. Of these avidya is of four kinds, in the shape of (1) sanshaya, doubt (2), viparyay misconception. (3) anadhyavasaya, indefinite or indistinct cognition and (4) svapna dream.
८.१२.१.१: १७४.२०संशयस्तावत्प्रसिद्धानेकविशेषयोःसादृश्यमात्रदर्शनादुभयविशेषानुस्मरणादधर्माच्चकिंस्विदित्युभयावलम्बीविमर्षःसंशयः ।
As for Doubt,—when two objects possessed of well-known distinct specific characteristics are seen and we perceive only the similarities between them, then we recall to our mind the peculiarities of the objects ; and from this cause, and also by reason of a certain adharma, there arises in our mind a pondering, in the form of ‘whether it is this or that’ and it is this pondering that constitutes Sanshaya, Doubt
८.१२.१.१: १७४सचद्विविधःन्तर्बहिश्च । अन्तस्तावतादेशिकस्यसम्यङ्मिथ्याचोद्दिश्यपुनरादिशतस्त्रिषुकालेषुसंशयोभवतिकिन्नुसम्यङ्मिथ्यावेति ।
It is of two kinds-, internal and external, where, an astrologer made certain predictions from certain circumstances, which turned out to be true in one case, but false in another,—if this same person makes for the third time similar predictions from similar conditions with regard to past, present and future events, there arises in his mind a doubt as to whether his predictions would turn out true or false ; and this is an example of Internal Doubt.
८.१२.१.१: १७४बहिर्द्विविधःप्रत्यक्षविषयेचाप्रत्यक्षविषयेच ।
External Doubt is of two kinds, as pertaining to perceptible and imperceptible objects.
८.१२.१.१: १७५.१तत्राप्रत्यक्षविषयेतावत्साधारणलिङ्गदर्शनादुभयविशेषानुस्मरणादधर्माच्चसंशयोभवति । यथाऽटव्याम्विषाणमात्रदर्शनाद्गौर्गवयोवेति ।
In the case of two imperceptible objects we find that when we come across a mark common to both of them we remember their peculiarities and then from a certain adharma there arises a Doubt ; e, g. when in a forest we see the horns only, we doubt whether the animal seen is a cow or a gavaya,
८.१२.१.१: १७५प्रत्यक्षाविषयेऽपिस्थाणुपुरुषयोरूर्ध्वतामात्रसादूश्यदर्शनात्वक्रादिविशेषानुपलब्धितःस्थाणुत्वादिसामान्यविशेषानभिव्यक्तावुभयविशेषानुस्मरणादुभयत्राकृष्यमाणस्यात्मनःप्रत्ययोदोलायतेकिम्नुखल्वयम्स्थाणुःस्यात्पुरुषोवेति ॥
In the case of two perceptible objects, like the post and the man when we perceive only the tallness that is common to both, and do not notice the crookedness and other marks peculiar to each there is no manifestation (in our mind) of the class ‘post’ or ‘man’; and then when we come to remember the peculiarities of each, the Self has its conviction swinging from the one to the other, and falls into a doubt as to whether the object seen is a post or a man.
८.१२.१.२: १७७.१०विपर्ययोपिप्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयएवभवति ।
Misconception also pertains to objects of Sense -perception and Inference only.
८.१२.१.२: १७७प्रत्यक्षविषयेतावत्प्रसिद्धानेकविशेषयोःपित्तकफानिलोपहतेन्द्रियस्यायथार्थालोचनातसन्निहितविषयज्ञानजसंस्कारापेक्षादात्ममनसोःसम्योगादधर्माच्चातस्मिंस्तदितिप्रत्ययोविपर्ययः ।
As an instance with regard to the perceptible objects, we have the case when of two objects possessed of many well-known qualifications, it so happens that the real thing is not perceived by the person who has his sense-organs deranged by such causes as bile, phlegm and wind ; and then the impression on the mind, left by the previous percept ion of the thing not before the observer, comes to effect the contact of the Self with the mind ; and from this contact, and also from a certain adharma there appears an idea of something which the thing is not ; and this idea is a misconception.
८.१२.१.२: १७७यथागव्येवाश्वैति। असत्यपिप्रत्यक्षेप्रत्यक्षाभिमानोभवतियथाव्यपगतघनपटलमचलजलनिधिसदूशम्बरमंजनचूर्णपुंजश्याअम्शार्वरम्तमैति ।
e. g. the idea of ‘horse’ with regard to the cow.
Even when there is no actual perception, there is an impression or semblance of it. As for instance we have such notions of perceptions as that when the clouds have passed off, the sky appears like the calm ocean ; and the nights darkness appears as dark as a mass of colyrium dust.
८.१२.१.२: १७७अनुमानविषयेऽपिबाष्पादिभिर्धूमाभिमतैर्वह्यनुमाणम्गवयविषाणदर्शनाच्चगौरिति ।
As regards inferable objects, we often find that vapour is mistaken for smoke, and from that the existence of fire is inferred; and also the sight of the horns of the gavaya leads to the inference that the animal is a cow.
८.१२.१.२: १७७त्रयीदर्शनविपरीतेषुशाक्यादिदर्शनेष्विदम्श्रेयैतिमिथ्याप्रत्ययःविपर्ययःशरीरेन्द्रियमनस्स्वात्माभिमानःकृतकेषुनित्यत्वदर्शनम्कारणवैकल्येकार्योत्पत्तिज्ञानम्हितमुपदिशत्स्वहितमितिज्ञानमहितमुपदिशत्सुहितमितिज्ञानम् ॥
With regard to the tenets of the Buddha and others opposed to the Veda, some people have the idea that they are conducive to actual welfare; and this also is an instance of wrong idea a misconception.
So also are the following – the notion of ‘self’ with regard to the body, the organs and the mind ; the idea of eternality with regard to caused things; the idea of the appearance of effects in the absence of adequate causes ; the idea of ‘evil’ with regard to persons advising what is really good for us ; and the idea of ’ good with regard to these who counsel evil ways.
८.१२.१.३: १८२.१अनध्यवसायोपिप्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयएवसंजायते । तत्रप्रत्यक्षविषयेतावत्प्रसिद्धार्थेष्वप्रसिद्धार्येषुवाव्यासङ्गादर्ह्तित्वाद्वाकिमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः ।
Anadhyavasaya, Indefinite or Indistinct, cognition also appears in regard to perceptible and inferable objects.
As regards perceptible objects, whether well-known or not, we find a mere idea appearing in the form ‘ what may this be’ due either to the absent-mindedness of the observer, or to the fact of his desiring to know (further details) with regard to it ; and this idea is what we call ‘indefinite cognition’.
८.१२.१.३: १८२यथावाहीकस्यपनसादिष्वनध्यवसायोभवति। तत्रसत्ताद्रव्यत्वपृथ्वीत्ववृक्षत्वरूपवत्त्वादिशाखाद्यपेक्षोऽध्यवसायोभवति ।
As for instance a Vahika (an inhabitant of the Daksha country) has such a cognition with regard to the jack fruit.
In this case there appear definite cognitions with regard to the fact of the object being—(1) an entity, (2) a substance (3) a modification of Earth, (4) a tree, (5) having a distinct colour, (6) and branches.
८.१२.१.३: १८२पनसत्वमपिपनसेष्वनुवृत्तमांरादिभ्योव्यावृत्तम्प्रत्यक्षमेवकेवलम्तूपदेशाभावाद्विशेषसंज्ञाप्रतिपत्तिर्नभवति ।
As for the generic character of the ‘jack fruit, that too-including all jack fruit trees, and excluding the mango and other trees, is distinctly perceptible; But it is only the particular name ‘jack fruit’ which is not duly recognized in the absence of a Specific term to that effect (from an older person).
८.१२.१.३: १८२अनुमानविषयेऽपिनारिकेलद्वीपवासिनःसास्नामात्रदर्शनात्कोनुखल्वयम्प्राणीस्यादित्यनध्यवसायोभवति ॥
As regards inferable objects, the inhabitants of the ‘Narikela’ continent, on seeing the dewlap, have an indefinite cognition as to what the animal having the dewlap may be.
८.१२.१.४: १८३.१३उपरतेन्द्रियग्रामस्यप्रलीनमनस्कस्येन्द्रियद्वारेणैवयदनुभवनम्मानसम्तत्स्वप्नज्ञानम्। कथम् ।
When the sense-organs have ceased to function, and the mind has retired then there come about certain mental cognisings through the sense-organs; and it is these that constitute ‘Dream Cognition.’ How?
Beings tired by their exertions during the day caused by their conscious bodily actions, retire at night with a view either to rest or to enable their food to be digested; and then the connection of the self and the internal organ, brought about by an effort due to the force of certain unseen agencies, causes certain functionings in the mind ; and then the mind retires peacefully into the heart which is the organ-less region of the self ; and then it is said to have “ retired.”
८.१२.१.४: १८३प्रलीनेचतस्मिन्नुपरतेन्द्रियग्रामोभवतितस्यामवस्थायाम्प्रबन्धेनप्राणापानसन्तानप्रवृत्तावात्ममनह्सम्योगविशेषात्स्वापाख्यात्संस्काराच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेणैवासत्सुविषयेषुप्रत्यक्षाकारम्स्वप्नज्ञानमुत्पद्यते ।
The mind having thus “retired,” the organs ’of the “man” cease to function. In this state the processes of inbreathings and outbreatBngs going on profusely, from such causes as, (1) “ sleep ” which is the name of a particular state of contact of the self with the mind and (2) impressions of previous cognitions,—there appears, through the sense-organs, a dream-cognition; resembling direct sense-cognition, with regard to objects that have no real existence.
८.१२.१.४: १८४.१तत्तुत्रिविधम्। संस्कारपाटवाद्धातुदोषाददृष्टाच्च ।
This dream cognition is of three kinds : (1) Due to the strength of impressions left by previous cognitions, (2) Due to the disorders of bodily humours, and (3) Due to unseen forces.
८.१२.१.४: १८४तत्रसंस्कारपाटवात्तावत्कामीक्रुधोवायदायमर्थमादूतश्चिन्तयन्स्वपितितदासैवचिन्तासन्ततिःप्रत्यक्षाकारासंजायते ।
(1) As for that due to the strength of impressions, it often happens that when a man, having a strong desire for something and thinking constantly of that thing; goes off to sleep, that same series of thoughts and mental images appear again in the form of sense-cognition.
८.१२.१.४: १८४धातुदोषाद्वातप्रकृतिस्तद्दूषितोवाआकाशगमनादीन्पश्यति । पित्तप्रकृतिःपित्तदूषितोवाग्निप्रवेशकनकपर्वतादीन्पश्यति ।
(2) As regards that due to the disorders of bodily humours, we find that a man in whose constitution, wind is the predominating humour, or in whose body wind has become disordered, he often sees (in a dream) that he is flying in the sky, and so forth. Similarly, a man whose constitution abounds in bile, or whose bile is disordered feels as if he were entering into the fire, and sees mountains of gold and such other things.
And one in whom phlegm predominates or is deranged, sees such things as crossing rivers and oceans, and mountains of snow and so forth.
८.१२.१.४: १८४यत्स्वयमनुभूतेष्वननुभूतेषुवाप्रसिद्धार्थेष्वप्रसिद्धार्थेषुवायच्छुभावेदकम्गजारोहणच्छत्त्रलाभादितत्सर्वम्सांस्काराधर्माभ्याम्भवतिविपरीतम्चतैलाभ्यंजनखरोष्टारोहणादितत्सर्वमधर्मसंस्काराभ्याम्भवति ।
(3) That due to unseen forces: Very often there appear in dreams certain cognitions—-of objects previous perceived and also those never perceived before, those known as well as those that are not known; and among these there are some, such as the riding on an elephant, the obtaining of an umbrella and such other things—which betoken the coming of something desirable; and these proceed from previous impressions and Dharma.
Of the opposite kinds are the rubbing of oil and the riding of asses and camels &c and these proceed from previous impressions and Adharma.
८.१२.१.४: १८४अत्यन्ताप्रसिद्धार्थेष्वदृष्टादेवेति ।
Those however that pertain to things absolutely unknown, proceed wholly from unseen forces.
८.१२.१.४: १८४स्वप्नान्तिकम्यद्यप्युपरतेन्द्रियग्रामस्यभवतितथाप्यतीतस्यज्ञानप्रबन्धस्यप्रत्यवेक्षणात्स्मृतिरेवेतिभवत्येषाचतुरिविधाऽविद्येति ॥
As for “dream-end” cognition, though this also appears in one whose sense-organs are inoperative, yet, in as much as in this we have the recalling of a past cognition, it is only a form of “remembrance”.
These then are the four kinds of Avidya.
८.१२.२: १८६.६विद्यापिचतुर्विधा । प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकस्मृत्यार्षलक्षणा ॥
Vidya also is of four hinds: (1) Directly sensuous, (2) Inferential,(3)Recollective and (4) Superhuman (III-L-S IX-ii- 1,6,23).
८.१२.२.१: १८६.१२तत्राक्षमक्षम्प्रतीत्योत्पद्यतेप्रतक्षम् [.५: प्रतीत्ययदुत्पद्यतेतत्प्रत्यक्षम् ] ।
८.१२.२.१: १८६अक्षाणीन्द्रियाणिघ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्छ्रोत्रमनांसिषट्। तद्धिद्रव्यादिषुपदार्थेषूत्पद्यते ।
Of these, that which proceeds from the sense organs is directly sensuous. The sense-organs are six—the nose, the tongue, the eye, the skin, the ear, and the mind. This knowledge appears with regard to substance and the other categories.
८.१२.२.१: १८६द्रव्येतावद्द्विविधेमहत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वोद्भूतरूपप्रकाशचतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद्धर्मादिसामग्र्येचस्वरूपालोचनमात्रम् ।
As regards substance, it appears with reference to three forms of it, in the gross form ; and proceeds from such causes as the existence of many parts, the appearance of manifested colour, and the presence of the contact of four things, aided by such auxiliaries as dharma and the like; in this the knowledge is in the character of ‘mere perception of form’.
८.१२.२.१: १८६सामान्यविशेषद्रव्यगुणकर्मविशेषणापेक्षादात्ममनःसन्निकर्षात्प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यतेसद्द्रव्यम्पृथिवीविषाणीशुक्लोगौर्गच्छतीति ।
From the contact of the mind as qualified by (1) generalities,(2) specialities (3) substances, (4) qualities, and (5) action,—there proceeds a ‘directly sensuous’ knowledge,—for example in the form, ‘the (l) existing; (2) substance, (3) earthy cow, (4) white and with horns, (5) is moving!
८.१२.२.१: १८६रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शेष्वनेकद्रव्यसमवायात्स्वगतविशेषात्स्वाश्रयसन्निकर्षान्नियतेन्द्रियनिमित्तमुत्पद्यते । तेनैवोपलब्धिः ।
With regard to colour, taste, odour and touch the sensuous knowledge is brought about by means of particular sense-organs, and proceeds from such causes as—their inherence in composite substances, peculiarities in the qualities themselves and the contact with the substrates of these qualities. The knowledge of sound proceeds from threefold contact ; and inhering in the ear, it is known by the ear alone.
Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Viscidity, Fluidity, Velocity and Action are perceived by the eye and the skin, through their inherence in perceptible substances.
८.१२.२.१: १८७बुद्धिसुखदुह्खेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नानाम्द्वयोरात्ममनसोःसम्योगादुपलब्धिः। भावद्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनामुपलभ्याधारसमवेतानामाश्रयग्राहकैरिन्द्रियैर्ग्रहणमित्येतदस्मदादीनाम्प्रत्यक्षम् ।
Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are perceived by the contact of both mind and self. Bhavatva (the character of ‘being’), gunatva (the character ‘quality’), karma (the character of ‘action’) and others— when inhering in cognisable substrates—are perceived by means of those sense-organs that perceive their substrates. This is the case with our ordinary ‘sensuous’ knowledge.
८.१२.२.१: १८७अस्मद्विशिष्टानाम्तुयोगिनाम्युक्तानाम्योगजधर्मानुगृहीतेनमनसास्वात्मान्तराकाशदिक्कालपरमणुवायुमनसस्सुतत्समवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषेषुसमवायेचावितथम्स्वरूपदर्शनमुत्पद्यते ।
for persons unlike ourselves—e. g. yogis in the ecstatic condition—there appear precisely true cognitions of the real forms of such things as their own self as well as the selves of others akasha, space, time, atoms, wind, mind,—the qualities, actions, generalities and individualities inhering in these,—and inherence ; and the cognition of these is brought about by the mind as aided by properties or faculties born of yoga.
८.१२.२.१: १८७वियुक्तानाम्पुनश्चतुष्टयसन्निकर्षाद्योगजधर्मानुग्रहसामर्थयात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेषुप्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते ।
In the case of Yogis out of the ecstatic condition, direct sensuous knowledge appears with regard to subtile, hidden and distant objects, by means of the mind through fourfold contact, by the force of faculties born of Yoga.
८.१२.२.१: १८७तत्रसामान्यविशेषेषुस्वरूपालोचनमात्रम्प्रत्यक्षम्प्रमाणम्प्रमेयाद्रव्यादयःपदार्थाःप्रमानात्माप्रमितिर्द्रव्यादिविषयम्ज्ञानम् ।
With regard to generalities and individualities, the only means of direct sensuous knowledge is the perception or cognition of the mere form ; the cognisables are substance and other categories ; the cogniser is the self ; and the cognition is the knowledge of substance, etc.
८.१२.२.१: १८७सामान्यविशेषज्ञानोत्पत्तावविभक्तमालोचनमात्रम्प्रत्यक्षम्प्रमाणमस्मिन्नान्यत्प्रमाणान्तरमस्तिअफलरूपत्वात् ।
In the appearance of the cognition of generalities and individualities, the means of direct sensuous cognition consists in mere ‘ aloeana (contact of the sense-organ and the object) ; for this there is no other means of knowledge; as it is not in the form of resultant cognition.
८.१२.२.१: १८७अथवासर्वेषुपदार्थेषुचतुष्टयसन्निकर्षादवितथमव्यपदेश्यम्यज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यतेतत्प्रत्यक्षम्प्रमाणम्प्रमेयाद्रव्यादयःपदार्थाःप्रमातात्माप्रमितिर्गुणदोषमाध्यस्थ्यदर्शनमिति ॥
Or, the means of direct sensuous cognition may be defined as any and every true and undefinable cognition of all objects, following from fourfold contact; substance and other categories are the cognisables; the self is the cogniser; and the recognition of the good (pleasant), bad (unpleasant) and indifferent character (of the things perceived) is the cognition.
८.१२.२.२: २००.४लिङ्गदर्शनात्संजायमानम्लैङ्गिकम् ॥
The laingika, ‘inferential,’ cognition is that which proceeds from the sight or perception of the linga, mark or ‘probans’.
८.१२.२.२: २००यदनुमेयेनसम्बद्धम्प्रसिद्धम्चतदन्विते ।
८.१२.२.२: २००तदभावेचनास्त्येवतल्लिङ्गमनुमापकम् ॥
The linga is that which is related to the object to be inferred and is known to exist in that which is connected with that object, not existing in that, wherein that is not present, —such a linga is the means of inference. (IX—ii— 1).
८.१२.२.२: २००विपरीतमतोयत्स्यादेकेनद्वितयेनवा ।
८.१२.२.२: २००विरुद्धासिद्धसन्दिग्धमलिङ्गम्काश्यपोऽब्रवीत् ॥
That which is otherwise than this, being devoid of either one or both of these characteristics, is either contradictory or unknown or doubtful; and is not a linga; So said Kashyapa.
८.१२.२.२: २०१.१८यदनुमेयेनार्थेनदेशविशेषेकालविशेषेवासहचरितमनुमेयधर्मान्वितेचान्यत्रसर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशेवाप्रसिद्धमनुमेयविपरीतेचसर्वस्मिन्प्रमाणतोऽसदेवतदप्रसिद्धार्थस्यानुमापकम्लिङ्गम्भवतीति ॥
(1) That which is Concomitant, either in time or place, with ‘the object to be inferred’—(2)
which is known to exist either in the whole or in a part of something endowed with the property of the inferred,—and (3) which is authoritatively known to be non-existing in the whole of that which is contrary to the ‘object to be inferred’— serves to bring about the inference of the unknown object, and it is linga (Inferential Indicative).
That which differs from the above mentioned linga in one or both points is not a linga (means) in the comprehension of the object to be inferred ; this is what the author of the Sutra has declared in the Sutra ‘apprasiddho napadesho’ sandigdhaccha (Vaisheshika-Sutra III-i-1.5).
८.१२.२.२: २०५.१०विधिस्तुयत्रधूमस्तत्राग्निरग्न्यभावेधूमोऽपिनभवतीति। एवम्प्रसिद्धसमयस्यासन्दिग्धधूमदर्शनात्साहचर्यानुस्मरणात्तदनन्तरमग्न्यध्यवसायोभवतीति ।
The process (of inference) is as follows : Whenever there is smoke there is fire ; where there is no fire there is no smoke —one who is cognizant of this concomitance, when he has an absolutely certain vision ‘of smoke he recalls to his mind its concomitance (with fire), after which comes the cognition of the presence of fire. (IX-ii-1).
८.१२.२.२: २०५एवम्सर्वत्रदेशकालाविनाभूतमितरस्यलिङ्गम्। शास्त्रेकार्यादिग्रहणम्निदर्शनार्थम्कृतम्नावधारणार्थम्कस्माद्यूतिरेकदर्शनात् ।
Thus in all cases when one thing is invariably concomitant with another in point of time and place, it becomes its linga (IX-ii-2).
In the Vaisheshika Sutra, the author has mentioned ‘effect and the rest only with a view to exemplification, and not for the purposes of restriction. How so? Because we find (Inferences) apart from those therein specified.
८.१२.२.२: २०५तद्यथाअध्वर्युरोंश्रावयन्व्यवहितस्यहोतुर्लिङ्गम्चन्द्रोदयःसमुद्रवृद्धेःकुमुदविकाशस्यचशरदिजलप्रसादोऽगस्त्योदयस्येति ।
For instance, the fact of the Adhvvaryu priest repeating om is indicative of the presence of the Hotr priest ; the rise of the moon is indicative of the rise in the sea, and also of the blooming of the water-lily ; the clearness of water in the autumn is indicative of the rise of the constellation of Agastya.
८.१२.२.२: २०५एवमादितत्सर्वमस्येदमितिसम्बन्धमात्रवचनात्सिद्धम्। तत्तुद्विविधम् । दृष्टम्सामान्यतोदृष्टम्च ।
These and such other inferences are all justified and pointed out by the expression asyedam (in the Sutra) which denotes mere relationship (of concomitance). (Il1-i-9 to 14,7 and 8).
This Inference is of two kinds: (a) the Drshta and (b) the Samanyatodrshta.
८.१२.२.२: २०५तत्रदृष्टम्प्रसिद्धसाध्ययोरत्यन्तजात्यभेदेऽनुमानम्। यथागव्येवसास्नामात्रमुपलभ्यदेशान्तरेऽपिसास्नामात्रदर्शनाद्गविप्रतिपत्तिः ।
The Drshta inference is that where the ‘prasiddha’ that which is already known (as concomitantwith the linga) and the sadhya whose presence has to be proved, belong absolutely to the same class.
As for instance, when one has seen the dewlap only in the body of the cow, whenever, on any subsequent occasion, he happens to see the dewlap, he infers the existence of the cow.
८.१२.२.२: २०६.१प्रसिद्धसाध्ययोरत्यन्तजातिभेदेलिङ्गानुमेयधर्मसामान्यानुवृत्तितोऽनुमानम्सामान्यतोदृष्टम् ।
When, however, the prasiddha and the sadhya belong to absolutely different classes the inference following only front the concomitance of the generic form of the linga with regard to the generic form ‘ of the object to be inferred and this inference is called the Samanyatodrshta.
८.१२.२.२: २०६यथाकर्षकवणिग्राजपुरुषाणाम्चप्रवृत्तेःफलवत्त्वमुपलभ्यवर्णाश्रमिणामपिदृष्टम्प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्यप्रवर्तमानानाम्फलानुमानमिति ।
As for instance, having found the activity of such persons, as the farmer, the trader and the servants of the king always leading to certain results we infer the fact that, of persons observing the rites of their respective castes and conditions alto, the activity, which is not found to have reference to any visible purpose, must tend to definite results.
८.१२.२.२: २०६तत्रलिङ्गदर्शनम्प्रमाणम्प्रमितिरग्निज्ञानम्। अथवाग्निज्ञानमेवप्रमाणम्प्रमितिरग्नौगुणदोषमाध्यस्थ्यदर्शनमित्येतत्स्वनिश्चितार्थमनुमानम् ।
In inference, the means of knowledge is the perception of the ‘ linga’ and the ‘ knowledge is the cognition of fire; or the cognition of fire itself may be regarded as the means and the knowledge is the cognition of the good or indifferent character of the fire.
Such is the inference that serves the purpose of one’s own definite cognition. (Il-i-8)
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २१३.१२शब्दादीनामप्यनुमानेऽन्तर्भावःसमानविधित्वात् ।
Word and the other means of knowledge, are included under * Inference * because of the process of those being similar to that of Inference,
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २१३यथाप्रसिद्धसमयस्यासन्दिग्धलिङ्गदर्शनप्रसिद्ध्यनुस्मरणाभ्यामतीन्द्रियेऽर्थेभवत्यनुमानमेवम्शब्दादिभ्योऽपीति ।
Just as for one who is cognizant of the invariable concomitance, there arises, from the perception of an undoubted linga and the remembrance of another concomitance, an inferential cognition of super-sensuous things,—so in the same manner, does cognition arise from Word(Sound?) &c also.
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २१३श्रुतिस्मृतिलक्षणोऽप्याम्नायोवक्तृप्रामाण्यापेक्षःतद्वचनादाम्नायप्रामाण्यम्लिङ्गाच्चानित्योबुद्धिपूर्वावाक्यकृतिर्वेदेबुद्धिपूर्वोददातिरित्युक्तत्वात् ॥
Scriptures even in the form of Shrutis and Smrutis depends upon the authoritative character of the speaker ; as the authority of the scripture rests upon his authority.
And that Word is non-eternal is proved by inference : — the creation, of a sentence is due to an intelligent action,’ and the word dadati in the Veda is preceded by intelligent action because of its being spoken of a* dadati (Vaiseshika sutras VI~i~ I & 3).
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २२०.१०प्रसिद्धाभिनयस्यचेष्टयाप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्तदप्यनुमानमेव ॥
In as much as we find that it is only one to whom the signification of the gesture is known who has a cognition by means of the gesticulation, that cognition must be regarded as inferential.
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २२०.१७आप्तेनाप्रसिद्धस्यगवयस्यगवागवयप्रतिपादनादुपमानमाप्तवचनमेव ॥
In as much as in the case of analogical cognition a trustworthy person describes the gavaya to one who does not know it, through the cow,— this must be regarded as a case of Trustworthy Assertion.
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २२३.१दर्शनार्थादर्थापत्तिर्विरोध्येवश्रवणादनुमितानुमानम् ॥
The Presumptive Cognition of a thing based upon a fact of perception is only ‘Inference per contraries’ ; and that based upon verbal cognition is an ‘Inference per Inference’.
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २२५.१०सम्भवोऽप्यविनाभावित्वादनुमानमेव ॥
Probability also following from invariable concomitance is a form of Inference. (IX-ii-5).
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २२५.१४अभावोऽप्यनुमानमेवयथोत्पन्नम्कार्यम्कारणसद्भावेलिङ्गम्। एवमनुत्पन्नम्कार्यम्कारणासद्भावेलिङ्गम् ॥
Negation also is mere Inference : just as the appearance of the effect becomes ‘indicative’ of the existence of the cause so also does the non-appearance of the effect become ‘indicative’ of the non-existence of the cause. (IX-ii-5).
८.१२.२.२.आ॒ २३०.२४तथैवैतिह्यमप्यवितथमाप्तोपदेशएवेति ॥
Similarly Tradition also, when true, is only trustwothy Assertion, (IX—ii—5),
८.१२.२.२.B॒ २३१.३पञ्चावयवेनवाक्येनस्वनिश्चितार्थप्रतिपादनाम्परार्थानुमानम् । पञ्चावयवेनैववाक्येनसंशयितविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानाम्परेषाम्स्वनिश्चितार्थप्रतिपादनम्परार्थानुमानम्विज्ञेयम् ॥
Inference ‘for the benefit of others’ consists in the expounding of something known to the person himself by means of a ‘five-membered’ sentence.
That is to say, when by means of the five-membered sentence a man expounds what he himself knows to be absolutely true, to other persons, who have either a doubtful or a mistaken idea about the thing, or have no knowledge of it at all , -then we have what is called ‘Inference for the benefit of others (X1-l1-1).
८.१२.२.२.B॒ २३३.२४अवयवाःपुनःप्रतिज्ञापदेशनिदर्शनानुसन्धानप्रत्याम्नायाः ।
These members are—(1)Pratijna -‘Declaration Proposition to be proved (2) Apadesha – Statement of the inferential indicative or ‘middle term’ (3) Nidarshana-‘Statement of the Major Premise, (4) Anusandhana – ‘Statement of the Minor Premise’ and (5) Pratyamnaya – Reiteration of the Conclusion’.
८.१२.२.२B१: २३३.२५तत्रानुमेयोद्देशोऽविरोधीप्रतिज्ञा ।
Of these (1) the Conclusion is the statement of what is to be proved by means of the Inference, and which is not incompatible with facts.
८.१२.२.२B१: २३४.१प्रतिपिपादयिषितधर्मविशिष्टस्यधर्मिणोपदेशविषयमापादयितुमुद्देशमात्रम्प्रतिज्ञा। यथाद्रव्यम्वायुरिति ।
That is to say, it consists in the mere statement of the * subject* endowed with the property sought to be proved, with a view to point out the substratum of the ‘indicative’!
As an example of this we have the proposition ‘Wind is a substance’. (IX-ii-1).
८.१२.२.२B१: २३४अविरोधिग्रहणात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्युपगतस्वशास्त्रस्ववचनविरोधिनोनिरस्ताभवन्ति ।
The qualification ‘not incompatible &c’ serves the purpose of excluding such propositions as may be contrary to (1) Sense-cognition, (2) Inference, (3) Scriptures regarded as trustworthy by the speaker, (4) that which would involve a self-contradiction,
८.१२.२.२B१: २३४यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निरितिप्रत्यक्षविरोधीघनमम्बरमित्यनुमानविरोधीब्राह्मणेनसुरापेयेत्यागमविरोधीवैशेषिकस्यसत्कार्यमितिब्रुवतःस्वशास्त्रविरोधीनशब्दोऽर्थप्रत्यायकैतिस्ववचनविरोधी ॥
e. g. the proposition (1) ‘just like ‘Fire’ it is hot’ would be contrary to sense -cognition, (2) that air (it was written as Akasha in original translation) is dense would be contrary to Inference ;
(3) just like the ‘Brahmana ought to drink wine’ would be ‘contrary to scriptures; ‘the effect (of air) is ever existing’ would be for the Vaisheshika, and be contrary to its own theory ; and
(4) that ‘word(sound) is not expressive’ would involve a self-contradiction. (Ill—i—15).
८.१२.२.२B२: २३७.१६लिङ्गवचनमपदेशः । यदनुमेयेनसहचरितम्तत्समानजातीयेसर्वत्रसामान्येनप्रसिद्धम्तद्विपरीतेचसर्वस्मिन्नसदेवतल्लिङ्गमुक्तम्तस्यवचनमपदेशः ।
The Apadesha consists in the statement of the ‘inferential indicative’. That which is concomitant with the ‘subject’ of inference, being known to be so concomitant at all times and with all individuals of the class to which the ‘subject’ belongs—and which, at all times is never concomitant with the contradictory of that subject,— has been spoken of as the inferential indicative’ ; and it is the statement or putting forward of this that constitutes ‘apadesha’ As for instance.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३७यथाक्रियावत्त्वाद्गुणवत्त्वाच्चतथाचतदनुमेयेऽस्तितत्समानजातीयेचसर्वस्मिन्गुणवत्त्वमसार्वस्मिन्क्रियावत्त्वम् ।
(in the same argument) the assertion—because wind has an action and is endowed with certain qualities) Here we find that action and quality exist in the subject (the wind) and the latter in all individuals of the class to which it belongs, and the former not in all of them ; and both of these are never found in anything that is not substance)
८.१२.२.२B२: २३७उभयमप्येतदद्रव्येनास्त्येवतस्मात्तस्यवचनमपदेशैतिसिद्धम् ॥
Hence the statement as to the presence of these in wind constitutes the apadesha (in the argument cited).
८.१२.२.२B२: २३८.९एतेनासिद्धविरुद्धसन्दिग्धानध्यवसितवचनानामनपदेशत्वमुक्तम्भवति । तत्रासिद्धश्चतुर्विधः। उभयासिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धःतद्भावासिद्धोऽनुमेयासिद्धश्चेति ।
By this it is implied that such statements as are either (1) asiddha 1 (unknown, unproved), or (2) Viruddha (contrary), or (3) ‘ sandigdha (doubtful), or (4) ‘ anadhyavasita (un ascertained), have not the character of the true reason (or indicative).
(1) Of these the unknown is of four kinds—(1) unknown to both (b) unknown to one of the two (3) unknown in the form wanted, and (d) the unknown—subject-of-inference.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३८तत्रोभयासिद्धःुभयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिनोरसिद्धःयथाऽनित्यःशब्दःसावयवत्वादिति ।
(a) The unknown to both is that which is not known to both the arguer and the person to whom the argument is presented e g, the argument – ‘sound is evanescent, because it is made up of parts’
८.१२.२.२B२: २३८अन्यतरासिद्धःयथाऽनित्यःशब्दःकार्यत्वादिति । तद्भावासिद्धोयथाधूमभावेनाग्न्यधिगतौकर्तव्यायामुपन्यस्यमानोवाष्पेधूमभावेनासिद्धैति ।
(b) As an example of the ‘unknown to one of the two’ we have—’sound is evanescent because it is an effect’.
(c) We have the unknown in the form wanted when what is meant to be indicated is fire by the presence of smoke, but what is put forward as the ‘ reason’ is steam, which is not known in the form of smoke,
८.१२.२.२B२: २३८अनुमेयासिद्धोयथापार्थिवम्द्रव्यम्तमःकृष्णरूपवत्त्वादिति। योह्यनुमेयेऽविद्यमानोऽपितत्समानजातीयेसर्वस्मिन्नास्तितद्विपरीतेचास्तिसविपरीतसाधनाद्विरुद्धःयथायस्माद्विषाणीतस्मादश्वैति ।
(d) We have the ‘ unknown—subject-of-inference 7 in the argument—‘ Darkness in an earthy substance because it is black in colour.
(2) That which while not subsisting in the subject of inference, does not subsist in any individual of the same class, and subsists in its contradictories -is what is known as the viruddha, contrary ’ reason, as it proves something quite contrary to the desired conclusion as an example of this we have the reasoning—’ This animal is a horse, because it has horns.’
८.१२.२.२B२: २३८यस्तुसन्ननुमेयेतत्समानासमानजातीययोःसाधारणःसन्नेवससन्देहजनकत्वात्सन्दिग्धःयथायस्माद्विषाणीतस्माद्गौरिति। एकस्मिंश्चद्वयोर्हेत्वोर्यथोक्तलक्षणयोर्विरुद्धयोःसन्निपातेसतिसंशयदर्शनादयमन्यःसन्दिग्धैतिकेचित् ।
That which, while subsisting in the object of inference, subsists in things of the same kind as that as well as in those of other kinds, is what is known as ‘sandigdha’, ‘Doubtful’ as it creates a doubt in the mind, e.g. ‘this animal is a cow, because it has horns!’.
Some people hold that when in any subject there is a collision of two ‘contrary indicatives explained above’ there arises a doubt ; and this is another kind of the ‘Doubtful reason;
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९यथामूर्तत्वामूर्तत्वम्प्रतिमनसःक्रियावत्त्वास्पर्शवत्त्वयोरिति ।
as for example in regard to the mind we find that the two reasons-(1) ‘because it has motion’ and (2) ‘because it cannot be felt by touch’ are put forward as indicative of its corporeal and non-corporeal character respectively.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९नन्वयमसाधारणएवाचाक्षुषत्वप्रत्यक्षत्ववत्संहतयोरन्यतरपक्षासम्भवात्ततश्चानध्यवसितैत्वक्ष्यामः ।
Objection ; ‘This would be a case of the asadharana reason ; because the two reasons cannot reside together either in the ‘subject’ or in its contradictory, just like non-visibility and perceptibility!
Reply: We shall explain later on that for this very reason the reasoning in question ‘is what is known as the ‘anadhyavasita,’ unascertained!
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९ननुशास्त्रेतत्रतत्रोभयथादर्शनम्संशयकारणमपदिश्यतैतिनसंशयोविषयद्वैतदर्शनात् ।
Objection : ” In the scriptures (the Sutras) we find it mentioned in many places that two contrary cognitions constitute the cause of doubt!’.
Reply ; Not so ; as doubts always arise from the dual perception of objects.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९संशयोत्पत्तौविषयद्वैतदर्शनम्कारणम्तुल्यबलत्वेचतयोःपरस्परविरोधान्निर्णयानुत्पादकत्वम्स्यान्नतुसंशयहेतुत्वम्नचतयोस्तुल्यबलवत्त्वमस्तिअन्यतरस्यानुमेयोद्देशस्यागमबाधितत्वादयम्तुविरुद्धभेदएव ।
That is to say, a Doubt is always produced by the perception of the dual character of an object ; and when both factors of the duality would be of equal authority, they would contradict each other ; and as such would not give rise to any definite cognition ; but they could not be the cause of any doubt ; as a matter of fact, in the instance cited, there is no equality of authority in the two factors of the duality ; as one of the two conclusions of the inference would always be such as is denied by the scriptures and hence this (that has been put forward as an instance of another kind of the doubtful reason) would be only another kind of the ‘contrary reason’.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९यश्चानुमेयेविद्यमानस्तत्समानासमानजातीययोरसन्नेवसोऽन्यतरासिद्धोऽनध्यवसायहेतुत्वादनध्यवसितःयथासत्कार्यमुत्पत्तेरिति ।
(4) That which subsists in the subject of the inference, but not in any other object either of the same kind or any other, is one that is not recognized by either party ; and as such, giving rise to
uncertainty, it comes to be known as the ‘unascertained’ reason ; as for instance— the effect is an entity, because it is produced.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९अयमप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेशैतिवचनादवरुद्धः ।
This is implied in the sutra—aprasiddhonapadeshah.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९ननुचायम्विशेषःसंशयहेतुरभिहितःशास्त्रेतुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषुविशेषस्योभयथादृष्टत्वादितिनान्यार्थत्वाच्छब्देविशेषदर्शनात् ।
Objection : This distinctive feature has been spoken of in the scriptures as the cause of doubt ; and the reason for this is that the distinctive feature of a thing serves to distinguish it from like as well as unlike objects (and hence the unascertained comes within the sutra that speaks of the “sandigdha and not within that which speaks of the ‘aprasiddha’ (‘unknown’)!”
Reply : Not so ; because of the meaning (of the sutra) ‘being different’.
८.१२.२.२B२: २३९संशयानुत्पत्तिरित्युक्तेनायम्द्रव्यादीनामन्यतमस्यविशेषःस्याच्छ्रावणत्वम्किम्तुसामान्यमेवसम्पद्यतेकस्मात्तुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषुद्रव्यादिभेदानामेकैकशोविशेषस्योभयथादृष्टत्वादित्युक्तम्नसंशयकारणमन्यथाषट्स्वपिपदार्थेषुसंशयप्रसङ्गात्तस्मात्सामान्यप्रत्ययादेवसंशयैति ॥
That is to say, (the author of the sutra having made the declaration that there arises a doubt as to whether the audible object, sound, is a substance, or a quality or an action)’ — the opponent has retorted that, in as much as the distinctive feature (of audibility) is found m sound, alone, there can be no doubt ; and to this the author of the sutra has replied by pointing out that the distinctive feature of audibility does not belong specifically to either the Substance. alone, or to the Quality alone, or to Action alone ; in fact it is common among all these ; as in each of these three (substance, quality and action ) we find distinctive features that distinguish them from like as well as unlike objects ; (and for this same reason, audibility also would be a feature that would belong in common to substance, quality and action ; and hence it would not give rise to a doubt) ; and thus what the sutra has done is to point out (that in the said manner, audibility might very well be regarded as leading to an uncertainty or doubt) and not that a distinctive feature becomes a cause or source of doubt. For, if it were not, then, there would be doubts with regard to all the six categories. For these reasons we conclude that Doubts always arise from the cognition of features common to more than one thing.
८.१२.२.२३: २४६.१४द्विविधम्निदर्शनम्साधर्म्येणवैधर्म्येणच। तत्रानुमेयसामान्येनलिङ्गसामान्यस्यानुविधानदर्शनम्साधर्म्यनिदर्शनम् ।
The Nidarshana, Instance, is of two kinds — that which corroborates by similarity or affirmation, and that which corroborates by dissimilarity or negation. The former kind consists in the recognition of the concomitance of the ‘indicative mark’, in general, with the ‘ subject’ in general.
८.१२.२.२B३: २४६तद्यथायत्क्रियावत्तद्द्रव्यम्दृष्टम्यथाशरैति। अनुमेयविपर्ययेचलिङ्गस्याभावदर्शनम्वैधर्म्यनिदर्शनम्। तद्यथायदद्रव्यम्तत्क्रियावन्नभवतियथासत्तेति ॥
E. g. (in the argument cited before) we have the statement – ‘ that which has action or motion has always been found to be a substance, as an arrow,’
The other kind of Instance consists in the recognition of the absence of the ‘indicative mark’ wherever there is absence of the of subject e. g. (in the same argument) the statements anything that is not a substance has no motion, as Being.’
८.१२.२.२B३: २४७.१अनेननिदर्शनाभासानिरस्ताभवन्ति ।
The above definition of ‘Instance’ sets aside all false or wrong Instances.
८.१२.२.२B३: २४७तद्यथानित्यःशब्दोऽमूरत्वात्यदमूर्तम्दृष्टम्तन्नित्यम्यथापरमाणुर्यथाकर्मयथास्थालीयथातमःम्बरवदितियद्द्रव्यम्तत्क्रियावद्दृष्टमितिचलिङ्गानुमेयोभयाश्रयासिद्धाननुगतविपरीतानुगताःसाधर्म्यनिदर्शनाभासाः ।
For instance, we have the argument—’Sound Is eternal, because it is immaterial’; and in corroboration of this we meet with the ‘Instance’ — whatever is found to be immaterial is also eternal e.g. (1) the Atom, (2) Action, (3) the Dish, (4)Darkness, (5) like ‘Akaca’ and (6) that which is a substance has always been found to have action or mobility.
Here we have examples respectively of the six kinds of the false Instance by affirmation: via, (1) the ‘unknown indicative’ (2) the ‘unknown subject’ (3) ‘ unknown indicative and subject : (4) not applying to its own substratum., (5) the unconnected or incoherent, and (6) connected with the contrary.’
८.१२.२.२B३: २४७यदनित्यम्तन्मूरतम्दृष्टम्यथाकर्मयथापरमाणुर्यथाकाशम्यथातमःघटवत्यन्निष्क्रियम्तदद्रव्यञ्चेतिलिङ्गानुमेयोभयाव्यावृत्ताश्रयासिद्धाव्यावृत्तविपरीतव्यावृत्तावैधर्म्यनिदर्शनाभासाइति ॥
Similarly we have—“ that which is noneternal is material”—as (1) action, (2) atom (3) ‘like akasha’ (4) darkness, (5) like the jar, (6) ‘that which is immobile is not a substance’— as examples respectively of the six kinds of the ‘false instance by negation by contraries’.:
(1) not excluded from the ‘indicative’ (2) not excluded from the subject (3) not precluded from both, (4) not applying to its own substratum, (5) Non-preclusive and (5) Precluded from the contrary.
८.१२.२.२B४: २४९.७निदर्शनेऽनुमेयसामान्येनसहदृष्टस्य्सलिङ्गसामान्यस्यानुमेयेऽन्वानयनमनुसन्धानम् ।
The reiteration of the concomitance of the ‘Indicative’ in general with the – Subject after the former has been perceived, in the ‘Instance,’ along with the Subject in general—constitutes the Anusandhana,
८.१२.२.२B४: २४९अनुमेयधर्मात्रत्वेनाभितम्लिङ्गसामान्यमनुपलब्धशक्तिकम्निदर्शनेसाध्यधर्मसामान्येनसहदृष्टमनुमेयेयेनवचनेनानुसन्धीयतेतदनुसन्धानम्। तथाचवायुःक्रियावानिति ।
That is to say the ‘Indicative’ in general is put forward (in the Premise) as a qualification of the subject not as having any potencies and in the ‘instance’ is pointed out as perceived along with the qualification of the Sadhya (object of Inference) in general ; and the statement that reiterates the fact of its existence in the ‘Subject’ is what is called the Anusandhana (the minor Premise).
E.g., in the same argument, the statement that ‘air is Mobile’ ; and also the statement that ‘the Air is not immobile’ which follows from the recognition of the fact of the indicative not being concomitant with the absence of the ‘subject’.
८.१२.२.२B४: २४९अनुमेयाभावेचतस्यासत्त्वमुपलभ्यनचतथावायुर्निष्क्रियैति ॥
and also the statement that ‘the Air is not immobile’ which follows from the recognition of the fact of the indicative not being concomitant with the absence of the ‘subject’.
The subject having been mentioned as the object of Inference, and yet not being fully ascertained as such, we have a reiteration of the Conclusion (Pratijna) for the purpose of bringing about certainty in the mind of the other person; and this Reiteration is called the ‘Pratyamnaya’.
प्रतिपाद्यत्वेनोद्दिष्टेचानिश्चितेचपरेषाम्हेत्वादिभिरवयवैराहितशक्तीनाम्परिसमाप्तेनवाक्येननिश्चयापादनार्थम्प्रतिज्ञायाःपुनर्वचनम्प्रत्यामनायः । तस्माद्द्रव्यमेवेति ।
That is to say, something is at first pointed out as to he proved ; and when it is not known quite for a certainty to be such as is wanted to be proved and token it is not known quite for a certainty to be such as is wanted to be proved, then—for the sake of such persons as have acquired the faculty of recognising the truth, by means of the ‘Reason’ and other aforesaid ‘Factors’ of the syllogism,—we have a reiteration of the conclusion ; and this is what is called the Pratyamnaya! E. g. (in the same argument) the statement ‘therefore Air is a substance’.
As long as this reassertion is not made, none of the other ‘Factors’ either individually or collectively has the power to express what is meant to be expressed by it.
Objection : “But what is expressed by it may certainly be implied by the other members”.
Reply: Not so ; as if it were so, then we would have many undesirable irregularities. As, (if we were to depend upon implications), then after stating the conclusion (in the Pratijna) it would be necessary to assert the ‘Reason’ only ; as the learned are sure to remember the necessary ‘invariable concomitance’ (sought to be put forward in the ‘Instance’) , and thence to deduce the necessary premises and conclusions.
For these reasons the argument must be regarded as ending with the ‘Pratyamnaya’ (or (Nigamana).
Question : ‘How so?’
Answer: For instance, in the first place we have the ‘statement of the conclusion’ in the form, ‘Sound is evanescent’- wherein we have only ‘sound’ mentioned as having the uncertain qualification of evanescence.’. Secondly we have the statement of the ‘Reason’ in the form—’because it always follows from effort’- herein we have the mere mention of a property calculated to prove the ‘evanescence’.
Thirdly we have the statement of the Instance in the form—’in the world all that is found to follow from effort is also found to be evanescent, as the jar’ —wherein we have merely the mention of the concomitance of the ‘Reason’ (following from effort) with the ‘ Object of Inference (evanescence ) in general;
and similarly we may have the statement of the negative Instance in the form—’the eternal is never found to follow from any effort, as the Akasha,—wherein it is pointed out that the absence of the Reason ‘is the absence’ of the ‘object’.
fourthly we have the statement of the ‘Anusandhana’ in the two forms of affirmation and negation— ‘sound is found to follow from effort’ and ‘sound is not found like Akasha to be independent of effort’—wherein we have the reiteration of the ‘Reason’ in general, whose powers have been ascertained by means of affirmation and negation, in ‘sound’ ; and then alone fifthly and lastly have we the certain conclusion (the Pratyamnaya) in the form—’therefore sound must be evanescent’ And thus we find that it is only in this way that we find the last ‘member’ affording the desired final conclusion ; and hence we find that it is only by means of the ‘five membered’ argument that something known for certain by the speaker can be proved to another person. Such then, is the Inference for the sake of others. (IX-i-1, 2.)
८.१२.२.२.C॒ २५५.२३विशेषदर्शनजमवधारणज्ञानम्संशयविरोधीनिर्णयः । एतदेवप्रत्यक्षमनुमानम्वा ।
A definite cognition brought about by the due perception of the special features, is called Nirnaya and this is opposed to Doubtful Cognition. It is only this definite cognition that can be either ‘perceptive’ or ‘inferential’.
८.१२.२.२.C॒ २५५यद्विशेषदर्शनात्संशयविरोध्युत्पद्यतेसप्रत्यक्षनिर्णयः ।
That which is produced by a sensuous perception of the special features, and sets aside all doubts, is the ‘perceptive judgment ;’.
८.१२.२.२.C॒ २५५यथास्थाणुपुरुषयोरूर्ध्वतामात्रसादृश्यालोचनाद्विशेषेष्वप्रत्यक्षेषूभयविशेषानुस्मरणात्किमयम्स्थाणुपुरुषोवेतिसंशयोत्पत्तौशिरह्पाण्यादिदर्शनात्पुरुषएवायमित्यवधारणज्ञानम्प्रत्यक्षनिर्णयः ।
e g when we see a certain object standing before us, we may perceive only the tallness, which is a property common between the pole and the man, and not perceive any of the features belonging specifically to either ; and then recalling to our mind the (other) features common to both, we have the doubtful cognition as to whether the object before us is a pole or a man ; after a time, perceiving that the object has a head and hands & c, we come to the definite cognition that it is a ‘man’ ; and this is a case of the perceptive Definite Cognition.
८.१२.२.२.C॒ २५५विषाणमात्रदर्शनाद्गौर्गवयोवेतिसंशयोत्पत्तौसास्नामात्रदर्शनाद्गौरुएवायमित्यवधारणज्ञानमनुमाननिर्णयैति ॥
Then again, seeing only a pair of horns in a thicket (and not any other parts of the animal’s body), we have the doubtful cognition that it is a cow or a Gavaya ; and then noticing the presence of the dewlap, we have the Definite Cognition that it is a ‘cow’ and this is a case of the ‘inferential’ Definite cognition.’ (IX-ii-I2 ; X-i-3.)
८.१२.२.३: २५६.१७ल्ङ्गदर्शनेच्छानुस्मरणाद्यपेक्षादात्ममनसोःसम्योगविशेषात्पट्वाभ्यासादरप्रत्ययजनिताच्चसंस्काराद्दृष्टश्रुतानुभूतेष्वर्थेषुशेषानुव्यवसायेच्छानुस्मरणद्वेषहेतुरतीतविषयास्मृतिरिति ॥
From the contact of the soul and the mind as aided by such causes as the perception of an ‘indicative’ ‘desire’ (for remembrance) and ‘associated ideas’ and the like, and from a faculty produced by distinct cognition, by repetition and by an impressive regard (for the object concerned) there arises a Remembrance of objects seen, heard or experienced (inferred) in the past, which becomes the cause of the recalling of what remains (of a previous cognition), of desire, of associated or secondary remembrance, and of aversion.
८.१२.२.४: २५८.१आम्नायविधातॄणामृषीणामतीतानागतवर्तमानेष्वतीन्द्रियेष्वर्थेषुधर्मादिषुग्रन्थोपनिबद्धेष्वनुपनिबद्धेषुचात्ममनसोःसम्योगाद्धर्मविशेषाच्चयत्प्रातिभम्यथार्थनिवेदनम्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यतेतदार्षमित्याचक्षते ।
In the case of the sages whose acts are in full accordance with the Vedas, we find that from the contact of the Soul and the mind, as aided by a peculiar virtue, there appears an intentional cognition true in all its objective details,—with regard to objects past, present and future, as also to Dharma and other (super-sensuous) objects, such as are spoken of in the scriptures, as well as those that are not so mentioned ; and this intuitional cognition is called ‘Arsha’ or ‘sagic’.
८.१२.२.४: २५८तत्तुप्रस्तारेणदेवर्षीणाम्कदाचिदेवलौकिकानाम्यथाकन्यकाब्रवीतिश्वोमेभाताऽऽगन्तिहृदयम्मेकथयतीति ॥
This cognition as a rule belongs to the Divine Sages; and only in rare instances to human beings also ; as when we find a little girl saying ‘my heart tells me that my brother will come tomorrow.’
८.१२.२.५: २५८.२१सिद्धदर्शनम्नज्ञानान्तरम्कस्मात्प्रयत्नपूर्वकमंजनपादलोपखड्गगुलिकादिसिद्धानाम्दृश्यद्रष्टॄणाम्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेष्वर्थेषुयद्दर्शनम्तत्प्रत्यक्षमेव ।
Occult perception is not a distinct form of Knowledge. “Why?”. Because the, perception of subtle, hidden and remote things that the perceivers of the things have—through their exerting of such occult powers as are obtained by the application of certain unguents to the eyes and to the feet, and by the use of the ‘sword’ the ‘pill’ and the like—is purely sensuous.
८.१२.२.५: २५९.१अथदिव्यान्तरिक्षभौमानाम्प्राणिनाम्ग्रहनक्षत्रसञ्वारादिनिमित्तम्धर्माधर्मविपाकदर्शनमिष्टम्तदप्यनुमानमेव ।
Then as for another kind of cognition that is regarded as ‘occult’—viz., the cognition of the fruition of past virtues and vicious deeds in the experiences of the living beings, of the heavens, the atmosphere, and the Earth, as indicated by the movements of plants and asterisms, — this also is only inferential.
८.१२.२.५: २५९अथलिङ्गानपेक्षम्ध्रमादिषुदर्शनमिष्टम्तदपिप्रत्यक्षार्षयोरन्यतरस्मिन्नतर्भूतमित्येवम्बुद्धिरिति ॥
As for the cognition of virtue & c, independently of inferential ‘indicatives’ this would be included either in ‘sensuous’ or in ‘Arsh’ cognition. Such then is Buddhi, (IX-ii-13).