८.६: १११.३-एकादिव्यवहारहेतुःसंख्या । सापुनरेकद्रव्याचानेकद्रव्याच । तत्रैकद्रव्यायाःसलिलादिपरमाणुरूपदीनामिवनित्यानित्यत्वनिष्पत्तयः। अनेकद्रव्यातुद्वित्वादिकापरार्धान्ता ।
(pg111) Number forms the basis of such usages as one and the rest. It inheres in one and in many substances.
The number inhering in one substance has its eternal and transient manifestations in the same manner as those of the colour &c. of the atom of water and the rest- The number inhering in many substances begins with ‘Two’ and ends with ‘Parardha (100,000,000,000,O00,000,000).
८.६: १११तस्याःखल्वेकत्वेभ्योऽनेकविषयबुद्धिसहितेभ्योनिष्पत्तिरपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद्विनाशैति। कथम् ।
This number proceeds from many unities as accompanied by the ideas of more than one object, and is destroyed by the disappearance of all distinctive notions (of one object as distinct from another).
To explain: when the eye of the person is in contact with two substances, be these either homogeneous or heterogeneous, then there arises a notion of unity subsisting in the quality of singleness which exists in each of the objects that are in contact with the Eye; and then there appears the single idea of the two singlenesses subsisting in the two objects,
this idea proceeding from the notions of the genus ‘unity’ and its relationships (to the objects in question).
Then with regard to this idea, these two singlenesses bring about the Duality of their substrates; and with reference to this Duality, there appears the generic idea of ‘Duality’.
८.६: १११ततैदानीमपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद्द्वित्वगुणस्यविनश्यत्ताद्वित्वगुणज्ञानम्द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानस्यविनाशकारणम्द्वित्वगुणतज्ज्ञानसम्बन्धेभ्योद्वेद्रव्येइतिद्रव्यबुद्धेरुत्पद्यमानतेत्येकःकालः ।
This generic idea of Duality leads to the destruction of the distinctive notion (with regard to each of the two substances taken individually); and simultaneously with this destruction there appears the idea of the quality of Duality, proceeding from the generic ‘duality’, its relationship, and its cognition,
Then the disappearance of the distinctive notions (of each of the substances) leads to the destruction of the quality of Duality ; as the notion of the quality of duality is the cause of the destruction of the generic idea of duality and simultaneously with this destruction of the quality of duality there arises the idea of substances as two substances, and disappearance of duality which leads to the idea of duality as quality and simultaneously with this there arises this impression out of the cognition of the substance.
Then from the cognition of the substance there follows the destruction of the idea of duality as quality and that of the idea of substance also from the impression (left by the previous conceptions).
८.६: ११२एतेनत्रित्वाद्युत्पत्तिरपिव्याख्याता । एकत्वेभ्योऽनेकविषयबुद्धिसहितेभ्योनिष्पत्तिरपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाच्चविनाशैति । क्वचिच्चाश्रयविनाशादिति । कथम् ।
(112) The same process would also apply to the case of the notions of three and the rest.
As these are also the proceeds out of unities as accompanied by the idea of many substances and disappear on the disappearance of the distinctive conception of the object.
In certain cases these notions (dualities etc) are destroyed by the destruction of the substrates themselves.
८.६: ११२यदैकत्वाधारावयवेकर्मोत्पद्यतेतदैवैकत्वसामान्यज्ञानमुत्पद्यतेकर्मणाचावयवान्तराद्विभागःक्रियतेअपेक्षाबुद्धेश्चोत्पत्तिः ।
To explain-when a certain action has commenced in that particle which is the substratum of unity and there arises generic idea of unity, the said action serves to disjoin that particle from other particle whence there arises the distinctive idea (of each of the particles).
८.६: ११२ततोयस्मिन्नेवकालेविभागात्सम्योगविनाशस्तस्मिन्नेवकालेद्वित्वमुत्पद्यतेसम्योगविनाशाद्द्रव्यविनाशःसामान्यबुद्धेश्चोत्पत्तिः ।
Hence at every time that there is a destruction of conjunction by the said disjunction, there appears duality, and the destruction of Conjunction leads to the destruction of the object (as a whole), and the appearance of the generic idea.
शोभनमेतद्विधानम्बध्यघातकपक्षेसहानवस्थानलक्षणेतुविरोधेद्रव्यज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । कथम् ।
At the -Very time that the generic idea destroys the distinctive idea, it is only natural that there should be a destruction of Duality, on account of the destruction of its very substrate.
All this is quite compatible with the theory that whenever an idea appears it always destroys the idea that preceded it.
In case however the incompatibility between two ideas consisted merrily in the improbability of their coexistence, there would be no appearance of the cognition of the Substance,
Because the distinctive idea having been destroyed simultaneously with the idea of quality and leading to the destruction of Duality, there would be no possibility of any such cognition of Substance as ‘two substances’.
Objection : In the case of inferential cognition, so here also (we would have the cognition of the substance) from mere cognition. That is to say, it has been explained under the Sutra Abhutam bhutasya (Ill-i-II) that in certain cases we have inferential knowledge, even in the absence of a definite Middle Term, from mere cognition; in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the quality (Duality) may have been destroyed, yet from the mere cognition of that quality there would proceed the cognition of the (Substance (as ‘two substances’)).
८.६: ११२न। विशेष्यज्ञानत्वात् । नहिविशेष्यज्ञानम्सारूप्याद्विशेषणसम्बन्धमन्तरेणभवितुमर्हति । तथाचाहसूत्रकारःसमवायिनःश्वैत्याच्छ्वैत्यबुद्धेःश्वेतेबुद्धिस्तेकार्यकारणभूतेइति ।
Reply: Not so; because the cognition in question is of the Substance as qualified (by Duality); and in as much as the qualification enters into the very essence of the qualified Object, there could be no cognition of the latter without some connection with the qualification. This is what has been declared by the author of the sutra, under VlII-i-9 :
The cognition of the white object proceeds from the cognition of the whiteness inhering in that object; and these same stand in the relation of cause and effect.’
८.६: ११३.१-नतुलैङ्गिकम्ज्ञानमभेदेनोत्पद्यतेतस्माद्विषमोऽयमुपन्यासःनआशूत्पत्तेःयथाशब्दवदाकाशमितिअत्रत्रीणिज्ञानान्याशूत्पद्यन्तेतथाद्वित्वादिज्ञनोत्पत्तावित्यदोषः ।
The case of inferential knowledge is different, as in that the knowledge produced is not such as makes the subject of the conclusion identical (with the mark or Middle Term). It cannot be argued that at the time of the cognition of the substance there is no actual destruction of the idea of the quality (of duality) because of extremely quick appearance .
That is to say, just as in the case of the notion the Akasha (I) is endowed (2) with sound (3) we find three distinct cognitions appearing quickly one after the other, so could it as reasonably be in like case of the appearance of the cognition of Duality &c., (i e, in the cognition ‘two substances’, the idea of substance appears after that of ‘two’ has disappeared ; but it appears so quickly upon the wake of the other, that the sequence- is scarcely perceptible, and gives rise to the idea that the two are simultaneous).
८.६: ११३बध्यघातकपक्षेऽपिसमानोदोषैतिचेत्स्यान्मतम्। ननुबध्यघातकपक्षेऽपितर्हिद्रव्यज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । कथम् । द्वित्वसामान्यबुद्धिसमकालम्संस्कारादपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशादिति।
Objection: “The objection that you bring forward would apply equally in the case of your own theory of one cognition destroying another. That is to say, in that case also, there would be no cognition of the Substance. Because simultaneously with the generic idea of ‘duality,’ there appears the Impression, which destroys all distinctive idea”.
८.६: ११३समूहज्ञानस्यसंस्कारहेतुत्वात्समूहज्ञान्मेवसंस्कारकारणम्नालोचनज्ञानमित्यदोषः । ज्ञानयौगपद्यप्रसङ्गैतिचेत्स्यान्मतम्ननुज्ञानानाम्बध्यघातकविरोधेज्ञानयौगपद्यप्रसङ्गैति।
Reply : Not so; because what brings about the impression is the collective post-cognition (of all the factors concerned) and not the mere perceptive cognition (which alone is held to disappear as soon as it is produced), Consequently the said objection (of the impossibility of the cognition of Substance) cannot apply to our theory.
Objection: “In that case there would be a simultaneity of cognitions, if the incompatibility of cognitions consisted in the fact of one of them being the destroyer of another”.
८.६: ११३अविनश्यतोरवस्थानप्रतिषेधात् ।
८.६: ११३ज्ञानायौगप्द्यवचनेनज्ञानयोर्युगपदुत्पत्तिरविनश्यतोश्चयुगपदवस्थानम्प्रतिषिध्यतेनहिबध्यघातकविरोधेज्ञानयोर्युगपदुत्पत्तिर्विनश्यतोश्चयुगपदवस्थानमस्तीति ॥
Reply : Not so.
Because what is denied by the Sutra ‘Jnanayugapadyat’ is the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two such cognitions as do not destroy each other; that is to say, what is denied is the idea that two cognitions can appear simultaneously and that they can coexist without the one destroying the other ; and in the case of the theory of one cognition being the destroyer of another, there is no possibility either of the simultaneous appearance of two cognitions, or of the coexistence of these, without the one destroying the other (Hence this theory is quite in keeping with the declaration of the ‘non-simultaneity’ of cognitions’ ).